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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
the DIVISION OF CONSUMER 
PROTECTION, Jean A. Williams, 
Director, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
GAF CORPORATION, a Delaware 
corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 19836 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff-appellant State of Utah, Division of Consumer 
Protection, alleged in its complaint that defendant-respondent 
GAF Corporation violated the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, 
Utah Code Ann. Section 13-11-4 (Supp. 1983), by declining to 
replace an asphalt shingle roof pursuant to alleged 
representations by a roofing contractor that the roof was so 
guaranteed. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court granted GAF's motion for summary 
judgment, ruling that the roofing contractor was not an agent 
of GAF, that GAF had never made any representations that could 
be construed as deceptive acts, and that the written guarantee 
given by GAF governed the consumer's claims (R. 51-52). 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent GAF Corporation seeks an affirmation of the 
Court's ruling in all respects. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although the facts in this case are simple and 
uncontroverted, the appellant's statement of them could lead to 
misimpressions at important points. Respondent GAF Corporation 
will restate the facts briefly. 
In June 1974, Dr. Dewey MacKay, a resident of Bountiful, 
Utah, installed a new roof on his home. (Deposition of Dewey 
C. MacKay at 4 (hereinafter l!Depo")). It was installed "under 
the direction of Pendleton Builders," who subcontracted the job 
to a roofing contractor (Id.). 
Dr. MacKay was "a neighbor . . . and long-time friend" of 
Ken Pendleton, the founder of Pendleton Builders (Depo at 5). 
Dr. MacKay testified in his deposition that Mr. Pendleton 
showed him or discussed with him several varieties of 
shingles--aluminum, hand-stripped or hand-shake cedar and 
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regular cedar. Mr. Pendleton, however, said that "the asphalt 
shingle would be just as good a roof and would be less 
expensive11 (Depo. at 6). 
Dr. MacKay selected defendant GAF's Timberline shingles. 
This type of shingle is covered by a written, limited warranty, 
with a "25 year bond11 (Asphalt Shingle Warranty, R. 33). 
Dr. MacKay does not recall whether or not he was furnished with 
a copy of this warranty by Pendleton, but the record indicates 
that appropriate steps were taken to preserve the coverage of 
the warranty after the job was completed (R. 33, 34, 35). 
In its complaint at Paragraph 10 the State alleges that 
Pendleton Builders was a !fGAF Corporation dealer11 (R. 3). 
However, no evidence in the record supports this allegation. 
When in 1981 Dr. MacKay had trouble with his roof, Mr. 
Pendleton advised him to contact GAF Corporation. Dr. MacKay 
then contacted a lfdealer in Salt Lake . . . who handled their 
materials.n That dealer referred Dr. MacKay to Mr.Fanter, a 
GAF representative (Depo. at 11). In spite of the State's 
allegations, Dr. MacKay never identifies Mr. Pendleton as a GAF 
dealer, even though he knows what a dealer is. Dr. MacKay also 
states that Pendleton Builders or its subcontractor must have 
bought the shingles from Harrington Company, the dealer that is 
identified (Depo. at 12). 
The roof apparently gave Dr. MacKay no substantial trouble 
until 1981 (Complaint at H 11, R. 3). Dr. MacKayfs concerns 
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about his roof had to do primarily with its appearance (Depo. 
at 10). The complaint alleges that there were no leaks (R. 4), 
but Dr. MacKay testified that he was concerned about the paint 
pealing off the ceiling in certain areas of his house (Depo. at 
10). 
In the summer of 1981, when Dr. MacKay first made 
complaints directed to GAF (R. 12), Mr. Don Fanter, GAF's 
representative, took some samples from the roof and, according 
to Dr. MacKay, reported that they did not comply with 
specifications for Timberline shingles (Depo. at 12-13). 
Dr. MacKay testified that GAF offered to compensate him under 
its written warranty, but he deemed the sum offered to be 
insufficient. 
Dr. MacKay testified that the roof cost him $2,400 to 
$2,500 when it was installed in 1974 (Depo. at 27). Dr. MacKay 
was unhappy when he learned that the written warranty covering 
the Timberline shingles would not cover the entire cost of 
replacing his roof (R. 26-27). He claims to have been given an 
oral warranty or heard representations by Mr. Pendleton, or 
perhaps the subcontractor Mr. Pendleton hired, that was 
substantially more favorable to him (Id.). He could not state 
the terms of this oral warranty except to say that Mr. 
Pendleton and perhaps the roofing subcontractor had said that 
he was getting GAF's best, top-of-the-line shingles and that 
the roof was guaranteed to last 25 years (Depo. at 22-23). In 
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its complaint the State alleges that Pendleton Builders 
represented to Dr. MacKay that GAF's Timberline shingles were 
nGAF Corporation's top-of-the-line self-sealing shingle, . . . 
guaranteed for 25 years11 (Complaint at 1T 10, R. 4). 
The fact is, as far as the record shows, that the 
Timberline shingles are GAF's top-of-the-line shingles, are 
made of the highest quality asphalt, and are covered by a 
limited warranty that provides some compensation for defects 
for a period of 25 years (R. 33). 
It is the limitations of this warranty that have apparently 
upset Dr. MacKay. He thought that if anything went wrong 
before 1999 he should be furnished an entire new roof, if 
necessary (Depo. at 8). When GAF did not agree with this 
position, he contacted the Division of Consumer Protection of 
the State of Utah and complained. The complaint in this action 
ensued. 
The complaint comprises two causes of action. The first is 
based on the allegation that GAF, apparently through Pendleton 
Builders, made representations to Dr. MacKay that the 
Timberline shingle was a fltop-of-the-line, self-sealing 
shingle, of the highest quality asphalt, and guaranteed for 25 
years" (Complaint at 11 10, R. 4), but that in fact, "at the 
time the shingles were purchased and installed, they were of an 
inferior quality and defective such that they would not 
self-seal, but instead curled after seven years and one month" 
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(Complaint at 1T 19, R. 4). This, the State alleges, is a 
deceptive act or practice forbidden by section 4 of the 
Consumer Sales Practices Act. 
The second cause of action is difficult to understand. It 
seems to be based on the notion that because Pendleton Builders 
allegedly represented to Dr. MacKay that he had a warranty that 
was broader than the written warranty, and GAF, upon being 
contacted by Dr. MacKay, stood on its written warranty, GAF had 
committed a deceptive act, even though GAF had never heard of 
Mr. Pendleton's alleged representations until Dr. MacKay made 
his complaint to them. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THIS ACTION 
WAS NOT PROPERLY BROUGHT UNDER THE CONSUMERS 
SALES PRACTICES ACT. 
In its opinion the District Court wrote: 
Under the facts of this case the plaintiff as the 
enforcing authority has no statutory authority to 
maintain an action to recover damages on behalf 
of Dr. MacKay because under Sec. 13-11-17(1) it 
can bring an action to recover, for each 
violation, actual damages on behalf of consumers 
who complain to have "within reasonable time 
after it instituted proceedings under11 the 
chapter of relating to consumers sales 
practices. It is apparent from the complaint 
that the only act complained of was the alleged 
misrepresentations by Pendleton to Dr. MacKay. 
Dr. MacKayfs complaint did not occur after 
plaintiff had instituted any proceedings under 
the act as authorized by (1)(a) and (b) of 
13-11-17, and plaintiff's only basis that 
defendant engaged in a deceptive practice related 
to the June, 1974, purchase of shingles by 
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Dr. MacKay from Pendleton. Dr. MacKay could have 
instituted his own action against defendant for 
the damages the plaintiff herein seeks to recover 
for him. The statute does not authorize the 
defendant to play such a role (R. 52). 
The District Court thus dealt with the question that 
immediately comes to mind upon reading the State's Complaint: 
why is the State, rather than Dr. MacKay, the plaintiff in this 
action? It ruled correctly that the enforcement provisions of 
the Consumer Sales Practices Act were not meant to provide 
public attorneys for private citizens with private causes of 
action. 
Although it is not mentioned explicitly in the District 
Court's written opinion, the State's attempts to construct a 
"deceptive act or practice" fall remarkably short of the 
standards dictated by common knowledge and common sense. In 
the First Cause of Action the State asserts that "Defendant 
indicated to Dr. MacKay that its Slate Blend Timberline shingle 
was a top-of-the-line, high quality, self-sealing shingle with 
a product life of at least 25 years.11 The State then alleges 
that lfat the time the shingles were purchased and installed, 
they were of an inferior quality and defective such that they 
would not self-seal. . . ." (Complaint at IT 19, R. 4). This, 
the State concludes (Complaint at 11 20, R. 4) was a violation 
of § 13-11-4(2)(b), Utah Code Ann., which provides: 
(2) [T]he following acts on practices of a 
supplier or the following indications by a 
supplier are deceptive: 
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(b) That the subject of a consumer 
transaction is of a particular standard, 
quality, grade, style, or model, if it is 
not. 
The State alleges that GAF "indicated that its shingles were of 
a particular standard, quality or grade when they were not" 
(Complaint at 5T 20, R. 4). This, the record shows, is plainly 
wrong. Aside from the fact GAF made no such "indication,11 the 
shingles provided were Timberline shingles. Timberline 
shingles are of the grade, quality or standard represented for 
them. For reasons that the record does not indicate, the 
particular singles provided were defective and not of 
Timberline shingle quality. 
The State's allegation that such circumstances amount to a 
deceptive act or indication implies that whenever a particular 
grade or category of product is sold, there goes with the sale 
the additional representation that the product never falls 
below the standards of that grade or category, i.e., that the 
product is never defective. 
The State obviously does not allege that such a 
representation was made or even implied, but without it, no 
deceptive act or practice is alleged in the First Cause of 
Action. As the District Court stated, Dr. MacKay could have 
filed an action in his own name based on some theory that would 
attempt to avoid the written warranty that governs this case. 
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The State's Second Cause of Action, paragraphs 22 through 
24 of its complaint, comes no closer to alleging a deceptive 
act. The "deceptive act11 is based on GAF's position that its 
written warranty is valid in the face of "Dr. MacKay's claim . 
. . based upon an express warranty on affirmation of fact or 
promise which has not been disclaimed or limited" (Complaint at 
IT 23, R. 5). This purported "express warranty" apparently 
arose out of Dr. MacKay's conversation with his friend and 
neighbor Ken Pendleton. Its scope and substance is never 
explained. Ken Pendleton had no authority from GAF to expand 
or modify its warranties (Waddell Affidavit, R. 19-20). Before 
July 1981, GAF had no knowledge of any purported representation 
or affirmation made by Pendleton Builders (Id.). In these 
circumstances, GAF did not indicate that the transaction 
involves or does not involve a warranty, a 
disclaimer of warranties, particular warranty 
terms, or other rights, remedies or obligations 
if the indication is false. 
Section 13-11-4(2)(j) U.C.A. (1983 Supp.) 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT 
PENDLETON BUILDERS HAD NO AUTHORITY, REAL OR 
APPARENT, TO ENLARGE OR OTHERWISE CHANGE GAFfS 
WRITTEN WARRANTY. 
The State's complaint against GAF is premised on the wholly 
unsupportable notion that Pendleton Builders or the subcon-
tractor Pendleton Builders selected to install the asphalt 
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shingles was GAF's agent for purposes of warranting the 
shingles. The record shows: 
1. Mr. Ken Pendleton was Dr. MacKayfs long-time neighbor 
and friend (Depo. at 5). 
2. Pendleton Builders were general building contractors, 
and this was known to Dr. MacKay (Id.). 
3. Mr. Pendleton discussed a variety of shingles with 
Dr. MacKay (Depo. at 6). 
4. Dr. MacKayfs impression that he had received a general 
warranty that his roof would be replaced if the shingles failed 
within 25 years was based entirely on the fact that 
Mr. Pendleton and perhaps the subcontractor had talked about a 
"25 year11 roof, that the shingles were "top-of-the-line," and 
similar statements about the shingles (Depo. at 6, 22-23, 
26-27). 
5. It is fairly inferrable, and any other inference is 
highly improbable, that Dr. MacKay knew that Pendleton Builders 
was not a "dealer" for GAF, and was supplying the GAF shingles 
for its own benefit (Depo. at 5, 11-12). 
6. Lawrence A. Waddell, GAF's district sales manager, 
states in his affidavit: 
. . . In 1974 .. . the only warranty provided 
by GAF for Timberline shineles was the written 
1Asphalt Shingle Warranty. A true and correct 
copy of this warranty is attached to the 
Memorandum in Support of the Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment as Exhibit A [R. 33]. 
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. . . Pendleton Builders of Salt Lake City, 
Utah has never been an authorized representative 
or agent of GAF and has never had any authority 
from GAF to extend oral warranties or 
representations with respect to GAF products. 
. . • Before July, 1981, GAF had no knowledge 
of any representation or affirmation of fact made 
by Pendleton Builders in connection with the 
alleged sale and installation of MacKay's roof in 
1974" (R. 18-20). 
The State claims that Mr. Pendleton, or Pendleton Builders, 
and perhaps the subcontractor had apparent authority to bind 
GAF to the warranty Dr. MacKay is asserting. The law of 
apparent authority is neatly stated in City Electric v. Dean 
Evans Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983): 
It is well settled law that the apparent or 
ostensible authority of an agent can be inferred 
only from the acts and conduct of the principal. 
Bank of Salt Lake y. Corporation of Pres. of Ch., 
etc., Utah, 534 P.2d 887 (1975). Where corporate 
liability is sought for acts of its agent under 
apparent authority, liability is premised upon 
the corporation's knowledge of an acquiescence in 
the conduct of its agent which has led third 
parties to rely upon the agent's actions. 
Kiniski v. Archway Motel, Inc., Wash. App., 21 
Wash. App. 555, 586 P.2d 502 (1978); Restatement, 
Agency 2d § 43. Nor is the authority of the 
agent "apparent" merely because it looks so to 
the person with whom he deals• Id. It is the 
principal who must cause third parties to believe 
that the agent is clothed with apparent 
authority. Kuehn v. Kuehn, Colo. App. 642 P.2d 
524 (1981), reh. den. (1982). Cf. Forsyth v. 
Pendleton, Utah, 617 P.2d 358 (1980). . . . It 
follows that one who deals exclusively with an 
agent has the responsibility to ascertain that 
agent's authority despite the agent's 
representations. Bradshaw v. McBride, Utah, 649 
P.2d 74 (1982). 
-11-
The apparent authority the State wishes to impute to Mr. 
Pendleton or the subcontractor fails to meet even one of these 
tests. The State argues that a manufacturer's mere 
promulgation of sales and promotional literature for use by the 
general public will, when the literature is used by a 
construction contractor as part of his efforts to obtain a job, 
clothe that contractor with authority to bind the manufacturer 
to warranties substantially broader than the written warranty 
the manufacturer otherwise gives. The law, however, requires 
knowledge by and acquiescence in the acts as representations of 
the purported agent. GAF knew nothing of Pendleton's purported 
representations until seven years after they were supposed to 
have been made. 
Comment C to § 8 Restatement Agency Second states: 
c. Belief by third person. Apparent 
authority exists only to the extent that it is 
reasonable for the third person dealing with the 
agent to believe that the agent is authorized. 
Further, the third person must believe the agent 
to be authorized. 
It should be held as a matter of law that it was unreasonable 
for Dr. MacKay to believe that Mr. Pendleton was an agent of 
GAF's. Pendleton Builders was obviously acting for its own 
benefit and profit, was not an exclusive dealer of GAF 
shingles, and was a construction contractor, not a 
manufacturer's representative or employee. 
The State does not read accurately any of the cases it 
cites in support of the proposition that Mr. Pendleton had 
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power to bind GAF. It claims that Cooper Paintings & Coating, 
Inc. v, SCM Corporation, 62 Tenn. App. 13, 457 S.W.2d 864 
(1970), involved a similar factual situation. In that case the 
Tennessee Court held where a Mr. Tippitt, an employee of the 
exclusive distributor for the defendant in the State of 
Tennessee, called on the architect for a building project, who, 
at his insistence, issued addendums to plans and specifications 
to permit the use of defendant's materials, and where the same 
employee furnished the plaintiff contractor with technical 
manuals written by the defendant and met with the contractor to 
discuss the roofs in question, and where the materials were 
shipped directly to the job site by defendant, then there was a 
basis for submitting the question of the agency relationship to 
a jury (457 S.W.2d 866-67). 
The distinction between the instant case and Cooper 
Paintings is clear. Here the purported agent was a general 
contractor with no apparent connection with the manufacturer, 
there the agent was an exclusive dealer and distributor. The 
literature in question here apparently involved only general 
promotional brochures; in Cooper Paintings it involved 
technical manuals. Here the product was merely sold to a 
customer; there its technical merits and competitive advantages 
were sold to both an architect and a contractor by an exclusive 
representative who was selling only this product and no other. 
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All of the other cases and rules cited by the State are 
even more wide of the mark. For example, Standard Distributors 
v. Federal Trade Commission, 211 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1954), 
involved a cease-and-desist order directed against a 
corporation, which order related to conduct of salesmen engaged 
directly by the corporation. The Restatement Agency 2d § 43(a) 
cited by the State at page 17 of its Brief involves 
acquiescence. Acquiescence requires knowledge of that which is 
acquiesced in. GAF had none until seven years after the 
purported agent had allegedly bound it. Upon learning of 
Dr. MacKay's demands, it stood by its written warranty. 
It bears noting that even if the power to bind another to 
warranties that would have considerable financial impact on the 
other were so easily acquired, the State still falls far short 
of establishing a deceptive act or indication on GAF's part. 
It would require a considerable change in the usual law of 
agency to make the question of Pendletonfs power to bind GAF 
even a close issue. That question could have been litigated in 
an appropriate civil action between private parties disputing 
it, as well as issues of warranty and the like. The State, 
however, would make a deceptive act of GAF's refusal to 
acquiesce to the proposition that Pendleton was its agent. The 
legislature could never have intended such a result. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set out above, the judgment of the District 
Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this /' 'clay of September, 1984. 
PLEFIELD SsPETERSON 
426T South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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